DPhil Project
My dissertation is provisionally titled "Artificial (non-sentient) Moral Agency." In it, I explore several interrelated theoretical and practical questions about the role of AI in moral action and decision-making. I consider whether it's possible (conceptually and technoloigcally) for an artificial entity to be a genuine source of moral action and/or a morally responsible agent. I also explore the relationship between AI-instantiated capacities and application contexts.
I have working drafts of the following papers:
- Artificial Non-sentient Moral Agency
- Two Types of Moral Agency
- Artificial Simple Moral Agency
Other Projects
Publications
Case Study: Lockdowns
part of the Liberty
chapter in Issues in Political Theory (edited by R. Jubb & P. Tomlin), Oxford University Press
Under Contract
Recent Experimental Work on 'Ought' Implies 'Can'
| link
| pdf
(with P. Henne)
Philosophy Compass (2019)
Against some Recent Arguments for 'Ought' Implies 'Can': Reasons, Deliberation, Trying, and Furniture
| link
| pdf
(with P. Henne, V. Chituc, F. De Brigard, & W. Sinnott-Armstrong)
Philosophia (2018)
Works in Progress
- The Right to Create Future Generations (paper)
- AI Sentience and Population Ethics (paper)
- Types of Moral Agents (x-phi project) (with J. Demaree-Cotton)
- People Infer Temporal Order and Causal Structure from Causal Judgments (x-phi project) (with K. Perez, A. Kulesza, L. Kirfel, & P. Henne)