DPhil Project

My dissertation is provisionally titled "Artificial (non-sentient) Moral Agency." In it, I explore several interrelated theoretical and practical questions about the role of AI in moral action and decision-making. I consider whether it's possible (conceptually and technoloigcally) for an artificial entity to be a genuine source of moral action and/or a morally responsible agent. I also explore the relationship between AI-instantiated capacities and application contexts.

I have working drafts of the following papers:

Other Projects


Case Study: Lockdowns
part of the Liberty chapter in Issues in Political Theory (edited by R. Jubb & P. Tomlin), Oxford University Press
Under Contract

Recent Experimental Work on 'Ought' Implies 'Can' | link | pdf
(with P. Henne)
Philosophy Compass (2019)

Against some Recent Arguments for 'Ought' Implies 'Can': Reasons, Deliberation, Trying, and Furniture | link | pdf
(with P. Henne, V. Chituc, F. De Brigard, & W. Sinnott-Armstrong)
Philosophia (2018)

Works in Progress