DPhil Project

My dissertation is provisionally titled "Artificial Non-sentient Moral Agency." In it, I explore several interrelated theoretical and practical questions about AI and moral decision-making. I consider whether it's possible (conceptually and technologically) for an artificial entity to be a full moral agent—and I explore some implications for the role of AI in the moral community. I am also interested in how future AIs might put pressure on the relationship between moral agency and moral responsibility. I have working drafts of the following chapters:

  1. The Concept of Moral Agency
  2. Artificial Non-sentient Moral Agency
  3. AI and Moral Agency

Other Papers


Recent experimental work on 'ought' implies 'can' [link] [pdf]
(with P. Henne)
Philosophy Compass (2019)

Against some recent arguments for 'ought' implies 'can': Reasons, deliberation, trying, and furniture [link] [pdf]
(with P. Henne, V. Chituc, F. De Brigard, & W. Sinnott-Armstrong)
Philosophia (2018)

Works in Progress

The right to create future generations
Under Review

People infer temporal order and causal structure from causal judgments (with K. Perez, A. Kulesza, L. Kirfel, & P. Henne)
In Progress

AI sentience and population ethics
In Progress